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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
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BUSINESS LAW
I. SECURITIES REGULATIONS AND THE UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
ACT
In State ex rel. McLeod v. Rhoades,1 the Supreme Court of
South Carolina reversed the trial court and granted a demurrer
to allegations that defendants violated the South Carolina Un-
fair Trade Practices Act (UTPA), also known as the "little FTC
Act," in connection with a public offering and sale of stock.3 De-
1. S.C., 267 S.E.2d 539 (1980).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10 to -560 (1976 & Supp. 1980). S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-
20(a) states that "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful."
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10(b) defines trade or commerce to "include the advertising,
offering for sale, sale or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intan-
gible, real, personal or mixed .... ." The UTPA was modeled on the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970); interpretations of the federal act were specifi-
cally intended by the South Carolina Legislature to provide guidance for the construc-
tion of the state act. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b)(1976). See also Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law, 28 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C-4, -5 (1969).
3. -.-- S.C. at - 267 S.E.2d at 541. The complaint in Rhoades alleged that, in the
offer and sale of stock of Cartridge Televisions, Inc., between July 1971 and July 1973,
defendant stockbrokers had engaged in various activities that violated the UTPA. The
alleged acts included the following: publication of false and misleading statements about
corporate assets in the prospectus; solicitation and sale of high risk stock to unsuitable
purchasers; failure to disclose material information about company production; reports
of false and misleading information about the financial health of the company; sale of
more shares than authorized and failure to disclose lack of registration of those shares;
manipulation and control of stock prices to defendants' advantage; precipitation of ex-
cessive churning activities to generate commissions on the basis of artificially high prices;
and failure to deliver or unreasonable delay in delivery of stock certificates. With the
exception of the reports of misleading information, all of the foregoing were alleged spe-
cifically to be unfair and deceptive in violation of the UTPA. Record at 7-15. Although
the date of the most recent violation alleged in the complaint is January 1973, Record at
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spite statutory language indicating that the burden of proving
an exemption from the UTPA is on the exemption's claimant,4
the court declared that once the claimant has established that
the transactions giving rise to the alleged violation are regulated
by other law,5 the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
specific transactions are not exempt.6
Plaintiff alleged several violations of the UTPA,7 and defen-
dants demurred on the ground that the activities giving rise to
the alleged violations were exempt from suit pursuant to section
39-5-40(a) of the South Carolina Code.8 The trial court over-
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40 states in pertinent part: "For the purpose of this sec-
tion, the burden of proving exemption from the provisions of this article shall be upon
the person claiming the exemption." For the language of the statutory exemption, see
note 8 infra.
5. The construction of the exemption provision of the UTPA presented the court
with a novel issue. The court had dealt with the relationship between the UTPA and
other bodies of law on only one earlier occasion, in State ex rel. McLeod v. Fritz Waidner
Sports Cars, Inc., 274 S.C. 332, 263 S.E.2d 384 (1980), in which the plaintiff alleged viola-
tions of the UTPA in connection with the sale of a car with false odometer statements,
also an offense under the Federal Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1981-1991 (1976). The court held that neither the language nor the legislative
history of the federal act mandated preemption of consistent state law remedies. The
court, however, did not apply a traditional preemption analysis under which, absent con-
gressional authorization or prohibition pursuant to concomitant state legislation, the
state legislation must be examined for frustration of congressional purposes and objec-
tives as expressed in the federal law. For an explanation and history of this approach, see
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). The South Carolina court looked instead at
the potential conflict between the state and federal laws, one of the three tests for pre-
emption enumerated in Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 505 (1956). The other two
tests are, first, a federal scheme so pervasive that there should be no state supplementa-
tion and, second, a federal interest so dominant that it precludes concomitant state laws.
Id. at 502, 504.
6. The court stated that once defendants, as claimants of the exemption, had
demonstrated the applicability of the exemption, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to
"show that the specific act in question does not come within the exemption." - S.C. at
- n.1, 267 S.E.2d at 541 n.1. In view of the statutory provision regarding burden of
proof, the court's allocation is questionable. See note 4 supra.
7. See note 3 supra.
8. .S.C. at .-- , 267 S.E.2d at 540. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(a) provides as follows:
"Nothing in this article shall apply to: (a) Actions or transactions permitted under laws
administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this
State or the United States or actions or transaction permitted by any other South Caro-
lina State law." The statute expressly exempts publication of advertisements in the news
media except under specified conditions, unfair insurance practices, and practices subject
to and complying with statutes and rules administered by the FTC. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-
5-40(b), (c), (d). Defendants also demurred on the ground that the action had not been
timely brought. Brief of Appellants at 10-11 and 27-29. The supreme court did not reach
this question because it disposed of the case on the exemption issue. .S.C. at , 267
2
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ruled defendants' demurrer, concluding that, although several
grounds of the demurrer were substantial, the case, "which is
complex in many ways, . . . must be settled on [its] merits
.... " On appeal, the state contended that the UTPA's exemp-
tion provision clearly indicated that only actions or transactions
specifically permitted by coexisting law were exempt from at-
tack under the UTPA, while defendants argued that segregation
of federal securities regulation from the general authority of the
Federal Trade Commission, accomplished by the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, indicated that the offering and sale of secur-
ities, already regulated by the South Carolina Uniform Securi-
ties Act,10 similarly should be invulnerable to attack under the
UTPA.11 The supreme court ruled that the demurrer should
have been granted based on its interpretation of the statutory
exemption language, "transactions . . . permitted by any other
South Carolina State law."1 2 It construed this language to ex-
empt an activity regulated by another body of law,13 relying on
the holding of the Rhode Island Supreme Court in State v.
Piedmont Funding Corp.,"' which concerned alleged violations
of Rhode Island's "little FTC Act" in insurance and securities
transactions.
In Piedmont Funding, the Rhode Island court stated that
upon registration or licensing to sell mutual funds, the "seller"
was "subject to monitoring by the appropriate regulatory agency
or officer." 15 Without distinguishing the regulatory scheme for
the securities market from that of other regulated industries,"
S.E.2d at 541.
9. Record at 24.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (1976 & Supp. 1980).
11. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-20(b)(1976). See Brief of Appellants at 13-15, 25-26, 30.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(a)(emphasis added). See note 8 supra.
13. - S.C. at . 267 S.E.2d at 541. The court did not discuss the South Carolina
Legislature's intent in interpreting the exemption provision.
14. - R.I-, 382 A.2d 819 (1978). The Rhode Island court's later decision in Per-
ron v. Treasurer of Woonsocket, - R.I. , 403 A.2d 252 (1979), does not appear to
restrict its decision in Piedmont Funding. The court in Perron sustained a cause of ac-
tion under the Rhode Island Deceptive Trade Practices Act, despite regulation of public
utilities by the Public Utilities Commission, on the ground that the contract at issue was
not within the purview of enacted regulations. Id. at , 403 A.2d at 255.
15. - R.L at , 382 A.2d at 822.
16. Because many business activities, ranging from the securities industry to real
estate sales and sales of professional services, are subject to varying degrees of monitor-
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the Rhode Island court stated that "because the conduct at issue
was clearly subject to the control of government agencies on
both the state and federal level, it is within the exemption proid-
sion and not subject to the mandates of the [Deceptive Trade
Practices] Act."
'17
Courts in other jurisdictions, however, have interpreted sim-
ilar statutory exemption provisions differently. The Supreme
Court of Minnesota, in Minnesota-Iowa Television Co. v.
Watonwan T.V. Improvement Association,"" construed the lan-
guage of the exemption provision in the Minnesota Antitrust
Law as creating no exemption from challenge to a contractual
arrangement not expressly allowed by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission, explaining that there was "'no pervasive reg-
ulatory scheme' with regard to the television industry" and that
existing FCC regulations simply did not pertain to the issues in
litigation. 9 The court concluded, furthermore, that to read "per-
mitted" as creating an exemption for any arrangement or act not
prohibited by other laws would be tantamount to saying that if
an act or arrangement was not prohibited, it was permitted, re-
gardless of its desirability.20 The Court of Appeals of Washing-
ton similarly construed the exemption provision of the Washing-
ton Consumer Protection Act2V1 and its amended version2 2 in
Regulated Industries Exemption under the Washington Consumer Protection Act, 10
GONz. L. REv. 415, 419, 424 (1975). In South Carolina, insurance transactions are ex-
pressly exempted from suit under the UTPA by S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-40(c), but the
vitality of the UTPA in other regulated industries is open to question.
17. - R.I. at -, 382 A.2d at 822 (emphasis added). The requirement of the Rhode
Island test that the activity be controlled at both state and federal level probably is not
crucial to the South Carolina court's application of the test, because South Carolina's
exemption statute expressly refers to activities permitted by other state law. See note 8
supra,
18. - Minn. -, 294 N.W.2d 297 (1980).
19. Id. at -, 294 N.W.2d at 305-06 (citing United States v. Radio Corp. of America,
358 U.S. 334, 350 (1959)).
20. - Minn. -, 294 N.W.2d at 306. In support of this interpretation, the court
noted that an otherwise identical exemption provision in the Missouri. antitrust laws dif-
fered from the Minnesota provision by employing "expressly approved" rather than
"permitted." Id. (citing Fischer, Spuhl, Herzwurm & Assocs., Inc. v. Forrest T. Jones &
Co., 586 S.W.2d 310, 313 (Mo. 1979)).
21. WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86-170 (1967) provided as follows: "Nothing in this chap-
ter shall apply to actions or transactions otherwise permitted, prohibited, or regulated
under laws administered by the insurance commissioner of this state ... or any other
regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United
States ....." (emphasis added).
4
South Carolina aw Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss1/3
1981] BusINEss LAW
Kittilson v. Ford.23 Acting on apparent legislative intent, the
Washington court interpreted the amended provision, which is
similar to the South Carolina UTPA's exemption provision,24 as
granting no exemptions for actions or transactions that were
prohibited or regulated by other statutory authority. The court
concluded that only those activities expressly permitted by other
statutory authority would be exempt from prosecution under the
Consumer Protection Act.
25
The South Carolina Supreme Court's construction in
Rhoades of the UTPA's exemption of actions "permitted" is
broad in its inclusion of actions "regulated" by another body.
The formulation of its test, "conduct... subject to the control
of governmental agencies," appears similar to the "pervasiveness
22. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86-170 (1978), as amended in 1974, states:
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to actions or transactions otherwise permit-
ted, prohibited, or regulated under laws administered by the insurance com-
missioner of this state,. . . or actions or transactions permitted by any other
regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the
United States....
Provided, further, that actions or transactions specifically permitted
within the statutory authority granted to any regulatory board or commission
established within Title 18 RCW shall not be construed to be a violation of
chapter 19.86 RCW. .. ."
(emphasis added). The Supreme Court of Washington in In re Real Estate Brokerage
Antitrust Litigation, -. Wash... 622 P.2d 1185 (1980), recently construed the provi-
sion: to claim exemption, persons regulated under Title 18 must prove "overt affirmative
action specifically to permit the actions or transactions engaged in." The court declined
to decide whether the portion of the exemption statute reading "actions or transactions
... permitted by any other regulatory body" required proof of affirmative action or
whether proof of simple acquiescence by the regulatory agency is sufficient. Id. at ,
622 P.2d at 1187. Because the Securities Act of Washington authorized promulgation of
securities rules, WASH. Ry. CODE ANN. § 21-20.450 (1978), it is probable that the deci-
sion in In re Real Estate Brokerage Antitrust Litigation would not be applicable di-
rectly to securities transactions.
23. 23 Wash. App. 402, 595 P.2d 944 (1979).
24. See note 8 supra.
25. 23 Wash. App. at 410, 595 P.2d at 948. In Kittilson, the exemption question
arose with regard to the potential conflict between the Consumer Protection Act and the
Securities Act of Washington. Id. at 404, 595 P.2d at 945. In this respect, the issue in
Kittilson differed from the issue in Minnesota-Iowa Television. The Minnesota court
concluded that the Federal Trade Commission had "'no pervasive regulatory scheme"'
for the television industry, so that the term "regulated" in the exemption provision did
not bar action under the antitrust laws. -- Minn. at _ 294 N.W.2d at 305-06. In Kittil-
son, however, the court concluded that under the amended exemption provision, the
term "regulated" would have precluded suit under the Consumer Protection Act for
those specific practices that were regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
23 Wash. App. at 408-10, 595 P.2d at 947-48.
5
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of the regulatory scheme" test employed in Minnesota-Iowa
Television.26 Under the first test, both the Rhode Island and the
South Carolina courts found that extensive concomitant regula-
tion under securities acts was sufficient to warrant exemption,
absent a showing that the exemption is inapplicable to specific
transactions. The latter test, however, has been construed more
strictly: when a specific practice forbidden by one act, such as an
antitrust law, is not within the purview of a second act, such as a
securities law, the regulatory scheme of the second act lacks the
degree of pervasiveness necessary to prevent challenge under the
first.27 Arguably, therefore, unfair offer and sales practices for-
bidden by the UTPA, as distinguished from fradulent practices
forbidden by both the UTPA and the securities acts, should be
subject to prosecution under the UTPA despite extensive regu-
lation under the securities acts.28
Lacking the clear legislative intent that guided the Minne-
sota and Washington courts, the South Carolina Supreme Court
may have been constrained by a policy of maintaining the integ-
rity of the extensive and complex provisions of both state and
federal securities laws when it interpreted "permitted" as "regu-
lated." Although the court articulated no policy reasons in sup-
port of its decision, a finding of a "pervasive regulatory scheme,"
upon which "sporadic action by .. . the courts" could "work
mischief, '29 may have been implicit in the opinion. Despite the
absence of direct conflict between substantive provisions of the
securities laws and the unfair trade practice laws, the policy of
26. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra.
27. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 373 U.S. at 355-61. In Silver, the Court
stated that "[r]epeal [of the antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied only if necessary
to make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent
necessary." Id. at 357.
28. The scope of S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-210 (1976) (covering fraud or deceit in offers,
sales, or purchases of securities) may be analogous to that of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission's rule 10b-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240-10b-5 (1980). That "unfairness" is not
within the scope of rule 10b-5 is made clear by the statement in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977) that the "fundamental purpose of the Act [is] imple-
menting a 'philosophy of full disclosures'; once full and fair disclosure has occurred, the
fairness of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the statute." It is possible,
however, that the standard of proof of unfairness may not be as difficult to meet as the
proof of fraud under the securities acts. A lighter burden of proof under the UTPA,
therefore, might influence courts against its use in the securities area if a substantial
increase in the number of suits could result.
29. United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. at 350.
[Vol. 33
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isolating regulation of securities transactions under existing se-
curities laws might better serve the complex goals of preserving
"the economic health of the investors, the exchanges, and the
securities industry" s0 than would permitting concurrent regula-
tion under the unfair trade practice laws, which are aimed at
consumer markets."1
The court's decision may also have been influenced by dif-
ferences in the remedies provided by the securities laws and
those provided by the unfair trade practice laws. For willful and
knowing violations, the UTPA, permits recovery in private ac-
tions of treble damages rather than the actual damages allowed
by the South Carolina Uniform Securities Act.32 Moreover, the
UTPA's limitations period generally is more liberal than that of
the Securities Act: the UTPA provides that an action may be
brought within three years after discovery of the unlawful con-
duct;3 3 the Securities Act states that an action may be brought
within three years of the contract of sale.3
30. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975).
31. See Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 46 TUL. L. Rav. 724
(1972). See also Note, Consumer Protection and the Proposed "South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act," 22 S.C.L. Rav. 767 (1970).
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act § 2, promulgated in 1964 by the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (Conference), 24 SUGGESTED
STATE LEGISLATION 10, 188-89 (1965), and the model draft of the Unfair Trade Practices
and Consumer Protection Law § 1, developed in 1967 by the FTC, 26 SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION 5, 5 and A-71, A-72 to -73 (1967), contain lists of unfair or deceptive acts
(referring to goods and services) from which a commercial and consumer orientation
might be inferred. The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act, a model act promulgated
by the Conference, is said in the introductory comments to "represent... an effort to
crystalize the best elements of contemporary federal and state regulation of consumer
sales practices .... " 32 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION 257, 257 (1973). A consumer
transaction is defined in § 2 of the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act as a "sale...
of goods, a service, or an intangible [except securities] to an individual. . . ." Id. at 258.
The comment to § 2 states: "In view of the extensive state regulation of securities trans-
actions, their inclusion is left optional." Id.
Thus, the FTC's 1967 draft law, which served as the basis for the South Carolina
UTPA adopted in 1971 and codified as S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 66-71 to -71.15 (Supp. 1975),
arguably did not contemplate inclusion of securities among transactions concerning "in-
tangible" property. The scope of "intangible" property may not have extended beyond,
for example, contract rights. Clearly, by the time the Uniform Commercial Sales Prac-
tices Act was drafted in 1971, 32 SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION at 257, the Conference
considered both the inclusion and the exclusion of securities.
32. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490(a)(1976).
33. Id. § 39-5-150 (1976).
34. Id. § 35-1-1530 (Supp. 1980). From 1971 through 1973,'the time of the allegedly
unfair sales in Rhoades, the limitations period was two years after the contract of sale.
7
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It is arguable, nevertheless, that the UTPA is an appropri-
ate alternative vehicle for prosecution of unfair and deceptive
trade practices in the sale of securities. Not only is the simplic-
ity of the statute a feature desirable to plaintiffs but the dam-
ages and limitations provisions of the UTPA might serve to dis-
courage further the unfair and deceptive practices at which the
South Carolina Uniform Securities Act is aimed. That the two
statutory systems might coexist is demonstrated by the decision
of the Washington Court of Appeals in Kittilson.'5 If the South
Carolina Legislature were to amend the exemption provision of
the UTPA to incorporate either the term "expressly approved
by" or the term "regulated by," legislative intent with regard to
the coexistence of rights of action under the UTPA and the Se-
curities Act would be clear. Unless the legislature so acts or un-
less a future plaintiff is able to overcome the exemption by car-
rying the burden of proof imposed by the court in Rhoades, that
decision may have foreclosed a remedy for securities violations
under the UTPA in South Carolina.
II. INSURANCE
A. Automobile Insurers' Right to Cancel Contracts with
Independent Agents-A Continuing Issue
After removal of the case from state to federal court, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Garris v. Hanover In-
surance Co.,36 that, to the extent that section 38-37-940(2)87 of
S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-313 (1962). The statute was amended in 1976 to extend the limita-
tion period to three years after the contract of sale. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1530 (Supp.
1980). It should be noted that the limitation periods in South Carolina in § 62-313 (1962)
and § 35-1-1530 (Supp. 1980) are directly applicable only to suits under §§ 62-309, -310
(1962) and §§ 35-1-1490, -1500 (Supp. 1980), which cover liability to buyers for illegal
and fraudulent sales or offers and persons jointly and severally liable with seller. It is
possible that the six-year limitation period for an action in fraud pursuant to S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-3-530 (1976) would apply to an action brought under S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-
1210 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-530(7) also provides that the cause of action in fraud
is "not ... deemed to have accrued until the discovery ... of the facts constituting the
fraud." (emphasis added).
35. See notes 21 & 22 and accompanying text supra.
36. 630 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1980). The case was removed to federal court on the
basis of diversity of citizenship by Hanover. Id. at 1003.
37. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-940(2)(1976) states that
[n]o insurer of automobile insurance shall cancel its representation by an agent
primarily because of the volume of automobile insurance placed with it by the
[Vol. 33
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the South Carolina Code confers a private cause of action for
termination of agency contracts entered into before its enact-
ment, the section violates the contract clause 8 of, the United
States Constitution. 9 The Fourth Circuit's decision in Garris
appears to conflict with Rowell v. Harleysville Mutual Insur-
ance Co.,40 in which the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that section 38-37-940(2), a provision of the South Carolina
Automobile Reparation Reform Act of 1974, Act 1177,41 did not
violate the contract clause.
4 2
In Rowell, Harleysville Mutual Insurance Company entered
into an agency contract with Rowell, an independent agent, that
was terminable without cause by either party on sixty days'
written notice. Subsequently, the South Carolina Legislature
passed Act 1177, which imposed on insurers the duty to insure
licensed applicants at rates established by the Insurance Com-
missioner. When Harleysville Mutual attempted to terminate
the agency contract, Ro~vell brought suit for violation of the en-
forcement provision in the Act, section 38-37-940(2).43 This sec-
tion provides that no automobile insurer may cancel an agency
contract because of the volume of automobile insurance con-
tracts generated by the compulsory coverage or because of the
amount of reinsurance necessitated." Harleysville Mutual con-
tended that the statutory prohibition of cancellation unconstitu-
tionally impaired its existing contractual right to termination.45
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial
court's determination that Harleysville Mutual's contract rights
had been impaired and held that the private enforcement provi-
agent on account of the statutory mandate of coverage nor because of the
amount of the agent's automobile insurance business which the insurer has
deemed it necessary to reinsure in the Facility.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
39. 630 F.2d at 1003.
40. 272 S.C. 108, 250 S.E.2d 111 (1978). For a complete discussion of this case, see
Business Law, Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, 31 S.C.L. REv. 1, 15 (1979).
41. Act No. 1177, 1974 S.C. AcTs, 58 Stat. 2718 (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-
37-10 to -1520 (1976 & Supp. 1980)).
42. 272 S.C. at 114-15, 250 S.E.2d at 114. See Note, The South Carolina Automobile
Reparation Reform Act (Part II): Compulsory Insurance-A Synopsis and Appraisal,
27 S.C.L. REv. 919, 947-49 (1976); see also Business Law, supra note 39, at 12, 16.
43. 272 S.C. at 109-10, 250 S.E.2d at 111-12.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-940(2). See note 37 supra.
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sion of section 38-37-940(2) was constitutional."
The facts in Garris are similar to those in Rowell. Garris
and Hanover Insurance Company entered into an agreement in
1974, which provided that Garris would act as an agent for Han-
over and stipulated that either party could unilaterally termi-
nate the agency on sixty days' written notice. In 1976, Hanover
terminated the agency relationship with Garris pursuant to the
agreement, and Garris brought an action in state court for viola-
tion of section 38-37-940(2). Hanover removed the action to fed-
eral court, where it obtained a summary judgment on the ground
that Garris lacked standing to bring a private action under the
statute.47 The district court explained that the prohibitory pro-
vision was intended to protect the public rather than insurance
agents. While appeal was pending in Garris,4 8 the Supreme
Court of South Carolina ruled, in G-H Insurance Agency v.
Travelers Insurance Companies,49 that section 38-37-940(2) was
not limited to the protection of the public interest but was in-
tended "largely" to protect the private rights of insurance
agents. In view of G-H Insurance, the Fourth Circuit remanded
Garris,50 and the district court again granted summary judgment
to Hanover, this time on the ground that retroactive application
of the statutory prohibition violated the contract clause of the
United States Constitution and Hanover's due process rights.
46. Id. at 113-15, 250 S.E.2d at 113-14. Justices Littlejohn and Ness found impair-
ment of contractual rights in violation of the contract clause and dissented. Id. at 115-18,
250 S.E.2d at 114-16.
47, 630 F.2d at 1003.
48. Id.
49. 270 S.C. 147, 241 S.E.2d 534 (1978). The majority opinion did not hold that the
provision created a private right of action. Rather, the court declared:
The question here is not whether the statute creates a private cause of
action for its violation. This action is one for the alleged wrongful and unlawful
cancellation of the agency contract, a right existing in G-H, the plaintiff, irre-
spective of the statute. The statute in question becomes relevant only in deter-
mining whether the cancellation was wrongful.
Id. at 152, 241 S.E.2d at 536. The majority stated that the agent's cause of action was for
ordinary breach of contract. The statute's relevance was apparently limited to determin-
ing whether the termination clause of the contract was valid. Implicit in the majority's
statement is the assumption that, if the statute protected agents who complied with Act
1177 mandatory coverage, a contract provision permitting termination of an agency con-
tract because of the undesirable results of mandatory coverage would be invalid. An ac-
tion would therefore lie for breach of contract on the basis of the invalid termination
clause. See Business Law, supra note 40, at 14-15.
50. 630 F.2d at 1003.
[Vol. 33
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On appeal, the Fourth Circuit found the contract clause issue
dispositive and affirmed the district court's decision. 51 The court
explicitly limited its holding to the constitutionality of retroac-
tive application of the statute's implied private right of enforce-
ment 2 and explained that it had addressed neither the constitu-
tionality of Act 1177 in general or "the prohibitions of § 38-37-
940(2)"53 nor the question of whether the provision created a
private cause of action."
Recognizing the need to balance Hanover's contractual right
against the state's police power if it should be determined that
the right was of sufficient magnitude and its impairment of suffi-
cient significance to raise a constitutional issue, the Fourth Cir-
cuit drew upon the United States Supreme Court's analysis in
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey55 and Allied Structural
Steel Co. v. Spannaus:5
[A]U [of the various factors appropriate for consideration] can
be taken into account in an analysis that asks in sequence: (1)
Has there been an impairment of contractual obligation suffi-
ciently severe to generate further constitutional concern? (2) If
so, is the impairment nevertheless saved against constitutional
infirmity because (a) it is imposed upon reasonable conditions
that absolutely protect the admittedly impaired interests, or
(b) it is in any event reasonable and necessary to the accom-
plishment of a discernible public purpose lying within the
reach of the state's police power? 57
The court then reasoned that, although section 38-37-940(2) was
phrased narrowly to prohibit only cancellation for volume of in-
surance placed or for amount of reinsured business, the statute,
51. Id. at 1003-04, 1011 n.12.
52. Id. at 1003. The Fourth Circuit did not address the constitutionality of the
prohibitions of § 38-37-940(2) but only of the retrospective application of the prohibi-
tions in a private cause of action. The court thus left open the question of the constitu-
tionality of the administrative sanctions of § 38-37-940. Id. at 1010 n.9.
53. Id. at 1005.
54. Limiting the decision to the federal contract clause issue, which was clearly
before the court, was apparently preferable to disposing of the case on standing, as the
district court originally had done. Id. at 1003. The latter would have involved the Fourth
Circuit in the broader issue of whether the statutory enforcement provision implied a
private right of action.
55. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
56. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
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in effect, subjected insurers to possible litigation to resolve any
conflict caused by termination.5 The court deemed this potenti-
ality an abrogation of Hanover's contractual right to terminate,
without undue delay or expense, an unprofitable or otherwise
undesirable relationship. Disposing of contentions that the regu-
lated nature of the insurance industry negated any apparent sig-
nificance of Hanover's contractual rights or the severity of their
impairment and that the state's annual licensing requirement
for insurance companies imposed express limitations upon Han-
over's reasonable contractual expectations, 9 the Fourth Circuit
found the impairment of Hanover's contractual rights suffi-
ciently substantial to raise a constitutional issue. Furthermore,
because the agency contract in question made no special provi-
sion for protection of existing contractual rights, such as a lim-
ited period for unilateral terminations, the court concluded that
the impairment of Hanover's contractual rights was not amelio-
rated by any special conditions and that a balancing of Han-
over's right against the state's police power was required.60
The court then undertook to determine whether the private
enforcement provision made "a rational accommodation between
the affirmative power exercised by the state and the negative
safeguard embodied in the Contract Clause." 61 Again employing
an analysis articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Allied Structural Steel,6 2 the Fourth Circuit found that there
was no emergency need for the provision, that the provision
therefore was not tailored to meet a passing crisis, and that its
effects were not temporary.63 The court also concluded that the
protection of insurance agents afforded by the ,private enforce-
ment clause was not essential to effectuate the public purpose of
the Act, which is to make compulsory automobile insurance
available at nondiscriminatory rates.6 4 The court based its con-
58. Id. at 1005-06.
59. Id. at 1006-07.
60. Id. at 1008.
61. Id. at 1009.
62. The five tests applied by the court in Garris were articulated in Allied Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978): (1) emergency need for statute; (2)
protection of the public rather than a specific group; (3) relief appropriate to emergency
need; (4) reasonableness of imposed conditions; (5) limitation to duration of emergency.
63. 630 F.2d at 1008.
64. Id. at 1010.
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clusion on the following considerations: insurers could not refuse
to write or renew policies of insurable persons,6 5 even if the con-
tract of the original agent had been cancelled;68 insurers could
not cancel their policies without justifiable reason; 7 and all of a
cancelled agent's business could be assigned to a reinsurance fa-
cility even upon cancellation of the agent by all his insurers.68
The court found that the goals of avoiding economic detriment
to individual agents and avoiding practical inconvenience to
drivers seeking insurance were not sufficient to justify impair-
ment of the insurer's contract rights."'
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Garris paralleled the dis-
sent in Rowell, which also had relied on the United States Su-
preme Court's analysis in United States Trust"0 and Allied
Structural Steel.7 1 Although the Fourth Circuit avoided direct
criticism of the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in
Rowell, it noted that the opinion did "not comport with [the
analysis] mandated by United States Trust and Allied Struc-
tural Steel, particularly in its suggestion that the Contract
Clause would be violated only if no public purpose could be con-
sidered served by challenged legislation.
'7 2
The Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Garris on the limited is-
sue of the constitutionality of the private enforcement provision
is more persuasive than that of the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Rowell. The provision is apparently not essential to a
public purpose, and there is consequently no justification for the
impairment of existing contractual rights that would result from
its retroactive application. Although an ecomomic burden may
be imposed upon individual agents whose contracts may now be
cancelled, consideration of that burden alone should not be suffi-
cient to allow impairment of preexisting contractual rights and
65. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-310 (1976)).
66. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-920 (1976)).
67. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-310, -320 (1976)).
68. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-37-150 (1976)).
69. Id. at 1010. The court buttressed its conclusion that the private enforcement
clause was not essential to achieving the public purpose of Act 1177 by referring to G-H
Insurance, in which the South Carolina court ruled that section 38-37-940(2) was
designed "largely" to protect private interests. Id. at 1010-11.
70. See note 55 supra.
71. See note 56 supra.
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consequent economic detriment to the insurer.7 3 The decision in
Garris precludes such an impairment by prohibiting retroactive
application of the enforcement provision to agency contracts en-
tered into before the passage of Act 1177 on July 9, 1974.7"
B. The Duty to Defend
In Gordon-Gallup Realtors, Inc. v. Cincinnati Insurance
Co.," the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that an insurer
is obligated to defend under a policy excluding coverage for
claims in fraud when the complaint, though "couched in terms
of fraud," nevertheless gives rise to an inference of negligent
misrepresentation.7 6 The court also held that an insurer who un-
reasonably denies coverage and refuses to defend a suit against
its insured is liable to the insured for the attorney's fees in-
curred in a declaratory judgment action to establish the duty to
defend brought against it by the insured.77 The holding in
Gordon-Gallup underscores the preexisting rule that the facts
alleged on the face of the complaint determine the duty to de-
fend .7  The award of attorney's fees for the prosecution of a de-
claratory judgment action, however, was a novel ruling in South
73. Regardless of the soundness of the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that no public
purpose underlying the enforcement provision was sufficient to warrant overriding the
constitutional protection of the contract clause, the South Carolina Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Rowell does not withstand scrutiny. The court's statement that the provision
did not affect contracts between an insurance company and its policyholders was not
germane because the contract at issue in Rowell, as in Garris, was between a company
and its agent. The statement that the statutory provision "operated solely on [the com-
pany's] relationship with its agent in the sale of insurance," 272 S.C. at 113, 250 S.E.2d
at 114, glossed over the crux of the dispute: the contractual nature of that relationship.
In contrast to the dissenting justices in Rowell and the Fourth Circuit in Garris, the
majority in Rowell failed to analyze the dispositive issue: the protection of the company's
contract right under the contract clause.
74. The impact of the decision, however, may be limited to actions brought in fed-
eral court. A federal court of appeals' decision is not binding on a state court. See, e.g.,
Security Management Co. v. King, 132 Ga. App. 618, 208 S.E.2d 576 (1974); Haynes v.
State, 16 N.C. App. 407, 192 S.E.2d 95 (1972). Thus, the courts of South Carolina are
free to enforce the holding in Rowell.
75. 274 S.C. 468, 265 S.E.2d 38 (1980).
76. Id. at 470-71, 265 S.E.2d at 40.
77. Id. at 471-72, 265 S.E.2d at 40.
78. See, e.g., Boggs v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 S.C. 460, 252 S.E.2d 565 (1979);
Stroup Sheet Metal Works v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 268 S.C. 203, 232 S.E.2d 885 (1977);
General Ins. Co. of America v. Palmetto Bank, 268 S.C. 355, 233 S.E.2d 699 (1977).
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Purchasers of a home brought suit against Gordon-Gallup,
the realtor for the transaction, alleging that the realtor's agent
had misrepresented the age and condition of the house they pur-
chased. Although their complaint repeatedly used the words
"fraudulent and deceitful" and used no terms explicitly referring
to negligence,80 it failed to allege scienter, the element that dis-
tinguishes actionable fraud from negligent misrepresentation.81
When Gordon-Gallup notified Cincinnati, its liability insurer, of
the suit, Cincinnati denied coverage and declined to defend the
suit on the ground that Gordon-Gallup's policy expressly ex-
cluded coverage for fraudulent acts.82 Gordon-Gallup then
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether
Cincinnati owed a duty to defend the suit brought against the
realtor by the home purchasers.8 The trial court found for
Gordon-Gallup and awarded it attorney's fees," and the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed.
The supreme court first explained that, because "the facts
alleged ... create[d] a reasonable possibility of recovery" under
the theory of negligent misrepresentation, Cincinnati had a duty
to defend under its coverage for negligence.85 Then, citing
79. Attorney's fees have been awarded in two other situations. First, the insurer is
statutorily required to pay all fees arising out of its unreasonable or wrongful failure to
pay a covered claim. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 38-9-320 (1976) provides as follows:
(1) In the event of a claim, loss or damage which is covered by a policy of
insurance . . . and the refusal of the insurer . . . to pay such claim within
ninety days after a demand has been made by the holder of the policy ... and
a finding on suit of such contract made by the trial judge . . . that such re-
fusal was without reasonable cause or in bad faith, the insurer. . shall be
liable to pay such holder, in addition to any sum or amount otherwise recover-
able, all reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of the case against the
insurer ....
(emphasis added). Second, fees expended by the insured in defense of the original suit
against him have also been awarded as damages for breach of contractual duty to defend.
See, e.g., Sloan Constr. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 183, 186, 236 S.E.2d 818, 820
(1977)(stating that the duty to defend is distinct from the duty to pay a judgment
against the insured).
80. Record at 5-6.
81. 274 S.C. at 470-71, 265 S.E.2d at 40.
82. Brief of Appellant at 2.
83. Record at 2.
84. Id. at 46-47.
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Hegler v. Gulf Insurance Co.,86 the supreme court upheld the
trial court's award of attorney's fees. In Hegler, despite the fact
that attorney's fees ordinarily are not recoverable absent either
statutory authority or contractual provision, the court neverthe-
less awarded attorney's fees to an insured upon his successful
defense of a declaratory judgment suit brought by the insurer to
determine the duty to defend.8 7 The court compared the actions
of an insurer that necessitate the insured's defending a declara-
tory judgment action to an insurer's failure to defend in an origi-
nal action and concluded that the insured is entitled to damages
for breach of contract in either instance.88
Although in Gordon-Gallup the insured instituted the de-
claratory action while in Hegler the insurer sought the relief, the
court in Gordon-Gallup reasoned that, for an insured, being
"forced to prosecute" was no different from being "forced to de-
fend an action to enforce his rights under the policy. . ."89 Its
citation to Hegler implied reliance on the comparison in that de-
cision of an insurer's refusal to defend in an original action to an
insurer's activities necessitating the insured's defending a de-
claratory judgment action. In the former situation, the contrac-
tual basis for award of attorney's fees as damages for breach is
clear. The insurer contracts to defend suits within the policy's
coverage and therefore implicitly contracts to retain defense
counsel for the insured. If the insured must personally retain de-
fense counsel because of an action by a third party against him,
the fees for retaining an attorney may be damages for which the
insurer will be liable. In the latter situation, however, the nexus
between the breach of contractual duty and damages in the form
of attorney's fees is not as patent. The insurer has agreed
neither explicitly nor implicitly to retain an attorney for the in-
sured to litigate the issue of whether a duty to defend exists.
Here, the propriety of awarding attorney's fees to litigate the is-
sue may be likened more readily to general litigation for breach
of contract. Absent statutory authority or a clause in the con-
86. 270 S.C. 548, 243 S.E.2d 443 (1978).
87. Id. at 550-51, 265 S.E.2d at 444-45.
88. Id. Institution of a declaratory judgment action by the insurer generally is held
to constitute an unequivocal assertion of nonliability. 7C J. APPLEMAN, INsURANCE LAW
AND PRACTICE § 4686, at 171 (Berdal ed. 1979).
89. 274 S.C. at 471-72, 265 S.E.2d at 40.
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tract providing for attorney's fees in the event of litigation, a
judgment of breach of contract ordinarily does not result in an
award of attorney's fees, even though, but for the breach, the
litigants would not have had to resort to court action. 0
In Hegler, the court appears to have employed a tacit "but
for" test in concluding that attorney's fees may be deemed dam-
ages arising directly from breach of the duty to defend: "but
for" the insurer's refusal to defend, the insured would not have
had to defend or participate in a declaratory judgment action to
establish the insurer's duty.91 Arguably, therefore, the insured's
right to recover attorney's fees in the declaratory action arises
from the insurer's breach of contractual duty in the first action.
Furthermore, Hegler appears to be based primarily on consider-
ations of fairness for the insured: an insurance company that has
"'guessed wrong as to its duty... should be compelled to bear
the consequences.' "9 The insured who has been wrongfully de-
prived of his right to defense at the insurer's expense should not
have to bear the cost of litigation to enforce the right of which
he was deprived.93 Moreover, when an insurer has not exercised
its option to defend under reservation of rights but instead has
sought a pretrial declaratory judgment,9 4 the imposition of attor-
90. See, e.g., Rimer v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742 (1966);
United States Rubber Co. v. White Tire Co., 231 S.C. 84, 97 S.E.2d 403 (1956). See also
J. CALA ARI & J. PERmLO, CONTRACTS § 14-36 (2d ed. 1977)(identifying the rationale for
the rule that an award of damages to the successful party does not ordinarily include
attorney's fees as the desire to avoid discouraging prosecution of claims by impecunious
plaintiffs).
91. See 270 S.C. at 550, 243 S.E.2d at 444. Such a test as a measure of damages is
approved in RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 361, comment e at 36 (Tent. Draft
No. 14, 1979), which states that "[r]ecovery can be had only for loss that would not have
occurred but for the breach."
92. 270 S.C. at 551, 243 S.E.2d at 444 (quoting J. APPLEMAN, supra note 88, § 4691,
at 283).
93. 270 S.C. at 551, 243 S.E.2d at 444 (citing J. APPLEMAN, supra note 88, § 4691, at
283). This approach is consistent with the South Carolina court's policy of strictly con-
struing exclusions from coverage or ambiguities in the insurance contract against the
insurer. Myers v. Calvert Fire Ins., 246 S.C. 46, 142 S.E.2d 704 (1965). Furthermore, the
burden of proving any exemption from coverage is placed on the insurer. Boggs v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 S.C. 460, 252 S.E.2d 565 (1979).
94. Cf., e.g., Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co. v. Main, 295 F. Supp. 207 (W.D. Mo.
1968)(attorney's fees denied when insurer defended under reservation of rights and un-
resolved issues warranted declaratory judgment action); American Motorists Ins. Co. v.
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 95 Misc. 2d 222, 406 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1978)(defense by
insurer under reservation of rights precluded insured's recovery of fees in declaratory
judgment action brought by insurer, though otherwise recoverable in New York). The
17
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ney's fees may be justified as a means to discourage spurious
disclaimers of coverage by insurers.
9 5
When, however, it is the insured who initiates a declaratory
action, particularly when he does so before settlement or, as in
Gordon-Gallup, before judgment in the suit against him, coun-
tervailing arguments may be made. In these circumstances, the
insured is not oppressed by the insurer's suit but, on the con-
trary, voluntarily brings suit himself." Whether or not the
award of attorney's fees then serves a goal of judicial efficiency is
debatable: the award, while possibly discouraging unwarranted
litigation by insurers, may encourage such litigation by insured
parties. Moreover, when there is no settlement or judgment in
the original suit, if the insurer's disclaimer of coverage can be
perceived as reasonably founded, the award of attorney's fees to
an insured for prosecution of a declaratory judgment action may
be inappropriate.
Unfairness alone, moreover, may not be sufficient justifica-
tion for a conclusion that the right to attorney's fees in a declar-
atory judgment action arises directly from breach of the contrac-
tual duty to defend.98 Some jurisdictions have taken the position
that attorney's fees will not be awarded when the insured takes
the offensive in bringing an action to determine his rights but
only when "he has been cast in a defensive posture by the legal
steps an insurer takes in an effort to free itself from its policy
South Carolina Supreme Court imposed fees in Hegler, despite the insurer's defense
under reservation of rights, apparently because the insurer "sought, through the declara-
tory judgment action, to avoid any obligation to continue to defend." 270 S.C. at 550, 243
S.E.2d at 444. The fairness of imposition of fees in these circumstances is questionable.
For a discussion of insurer's options regarding disclaimer of liability and refusal to
defend, defense with the intent of eventual disclaimer, and prosecution for declaratory
judgment, see Note, Liability Insurance Policy Defenses and the Duty to Defend, 68
HARv. L. REV. 1436, 1442-50 (1954-55).
95. See Felicetta v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 117 N.J. Super. 524, 285 A.2d 242
(App. Div. 1971)(award of attorney's fees allowable pursuant to statute; a statutory pur-
pose to discourage groundless refusals to defend).
96. See Mighty Midgets, Inc. v. Centennial Ins. Co., 47 N.Y.2d 12, 389 N.E.2d 1080,
416 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1979).
97. See, e.g., Mid-South Ins. Co. v. Dellinger, 239 Ark. 169, 388 S.W.2d 6 (1965);
Maryland Park Auto Ins. Fund v. Sparks, - Md. App. -, 400 A.2d 26 (1979).
98. Only a minority of jurisdictions are willing to award attorney's fees in the ab-
sence of statutory authority or policy provisions covering expenses at the insurer's re-
quest. See, e.g., Brohawn v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975);
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 50 Ohio App.2d 361, 4 Ohio Op. 3d 315, 363 N.E.2d 596
(1976); American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 26 Utah 2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042 (1971).
[Vol. 33
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol33/iss1/3
BusiNEss LAW
obligations."99 Other courts have made such an award only when
the insurer's refusal to defend was unreasonable or fraudulent.100
It remains unclear whether South Carolina courts will re-
quire a showing of bad faith or unreasonableness as a basis for
recovering attorney's fees for refusal to defend. 10 1 Because these
standards have not been adequately defined in South Caro-
lina,10 2 the suitability of their application to an insurer's refusal
to defend is questionable.as The duty to defend must be deter-
mined from frequently ambiguous allegations of fact in the com-
plaint against the insured.110 Absent clearer standards than un-
reasonableness or lack of good faith, penalizing an insurer by the
imposition of attorney's fees for refusal to defend may be unwar-
ranted when factual allegations in the complaint arguably are
not within a policy's coverage.10 5
Ultimately, consideration and evaluation of the various pol-
icy arguments may be more appropriately within the purview of
the legislature than the courts. The South Carolina Legislature
has not given statutory authorization for award of attorney's
fees in a declaratory judgment suit to establish the duty to de-
fend, and the contractual basis supporting such an award is ten-
uous. Nevertheless, Gordon-Gallup and Hegler have created the
99. 47 N.Y.2d at 12, 389 N.E.2d at 1085, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 564.
100. E.g., 239 Ark. 169, 388 S.W.2d 6; - Md. App. -, 400 A.2d 26.
101. In Gordon-Gallup, the court noted that the insurer had "unreasonably refused
to defend" but the court did not expressly impose a good faith or reasonableness stan-
dard. 274 S.C. at 472, 265 S.E.2d at 40. In Hegler, however, the court, without expressly
mentioning the good faith standard, recognized a split of authority on the issue of an
insurer's liability for an insured's attorney's fees in a declaratory action and then cited
with approval a passage from J. APPLEmAN, supra note 88, finding the imposition of the
good faith standard unfair to the insured. 270 S.C. at 551, 243 S.E.2d at 445.
102. In Baker v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 268 S.C. 609, 235 S.E.2d 300 (1977)(applying
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-9-320), the court suggested that the measure for good faith or rea-
sonableness is a preponderance of the evidence as determined at trial. Id. at 613, 235
S.E.2d at 302.
103. These tests apply more readily to an insurer's refusal to pay a claim than to a
refusal to defend. The duty to defend generally has been construed to be much broader
than the duty to pay and arises whenever there is potential liability based on facts at the
outset of the case. J. APPLEMAN, supra note 88, § 4684, at 83. Compare Baker, 268 S.C.
609, 235 S.E.2d 300 with Gordon-Gallup, 274 S.C. 468, 265 S.E.2d 38.
104. See Mrachek, The Insurer's Options, 54 FLA. B.J. 341, 341-43 (1980).
105. For decisions in other jurisdictions in which bad faith or unreasonableness in
the refusal to defend are defined more clearly, see Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pacific
Indem. Co., 557 F.2d 51 (3d Cir. 1977)(applying Pennsylvania law); Maryland Auto Ins.
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right to attorney's fees in that circumstance. Furthermore,
Gordon-Gallup has reemphasized the importance of an insurer's
ascertaining with care the nature of the allegations in a com-
plaint against its insured. If the insurer miscalculates its duty, it
may be liable twice for attorney's fees: those in the initial suit
against the insured and those in a declaratory judgment suit to
which the insured is a party.
Anne G. H. Rounds
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